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Systems, methods and computer program products partition 
a whole program when it does not fit in a device's memory. 
Minimal, safe program partitions are downloaded from the 
server on demand into the embedded device just before their 
execution. Code and data of the program are partitioned such 
that no information regarding the control flow behavior of 
the program is leaked out. Thus, by observing the program 
partitions that are downloaded from the server to the device, 
an attacker is unable to guess which branches are taken in 
the program and what is the control flow of the program. 
This property of tamper resistance is valuable for secure 
embedded devices, such as smart cards, which could hold 
sensitive information and/or carry out critical computation 
such as financial transactions. 
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Let s0 = 1. 
Fork= 0 upto w-1: 
If (bit k of x) is 1 then 
Let Rk = (sk*Y) mod n. 
Else 
Let Rk = sk. 
Let sk+I = R2k mod n. 
EndFor. 
Return (Rw-1). 
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struct CallGraphNode 
{ 
}; 
BOOL visited; 
BOOL non_recuning; 
BOOL is_single_occurrence; 
BOOL is_in_loop; 
BOOL is_addr_taken; 
CallGraphNode * preds; 
CallGraphNode * succs; 
II only one static occurrence? 
II is in a loop body? 
II ever assigned to a function pointer? 
void find_ nonrecurring_ functions() 
{ 
CallGraphNode *root= build_augmented_call_graph(); 
en_queue (root); 
While ( ! is_queue_empty()) 
{ 
cur_node =de_ queue(); 
if( cur_node-7visited) 
continue; 
cur_ node -7 non_recurring =FALSE; 
if( cur_node ==root) II root node 
{ 
cur_node-7non_recurring =TRUE; 
} 
else if( cur_node-7is_single_occurence) 
{ 
pred = cur_ node-7 preds; II single predecessor 
US 7,269,671 B2 
if(pred -7 non_recurring && !cur_node-7 is_in_loop && !cur_node-7is_addr_taken) 
cur_node -7 non_recurring =TRUE; 
} 
} 
cur_node -7 visited= TRUE; 
for V succ E cur_node-7 succs 
en_queue ( succ ); 
'"] 
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U.S. Patent Sep.11,2007 Sheet 4 of 14 
YES 
NO 
Mark Non-Root Node ~-Y_E_s-< 
As Recurring 
74 
72 
Identify Non-Root 
Node In Augmented 
Call Graph 
YES 
NO 
YES 
FIG. 4 
64 
NO 
US 7,269,671 B2 
66 
68 
70 
Mark Non-Root Node 
As Non-Recurring 
76 
U.S. Patent Sep.11,2007 Sheet 5 of 14 US 7,269,671 B2 
80 
L11 
L21 86 
Call F1 
L22 88 
84 
92 
FIG. 5 
U.S. Patent Sep. 11,2007 Sheet 6of14 US 7,269,671 B2 
~ 
94 
FIG. 6A 
~ 
96 
FIG. 68 
U.S. Patent Sep. 11,2007 Sheet 7of14 US 7,269,671 B2 
void partition_non_recurring_under_keep_nothing ( non_recurring_function) 
{ 
cfg =build_ function_ CFG ( non _recurring_function ); 
dominance_analysis_identify_loop_body( cfg ); 
for '\/ basic_ block E cfg 
{ 
} 
II basic block has been processed? 
if ( is _in_ created_ safe _partitions (basic_ block)) 
continue; 
if ( is_inside_loop_body (basic_block)) 
ere.ate_ new _minimal_ safe _partition ( get_loop _body (basic _block)); 
else 
create_ new_ minimal_ safe _partition (basic_ block); 
FIG. 7 
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void partition _recurring_ under_ keep_ nothing (recurring_ function) 
{ 
cfg = build_function_CFG (recurring_ function); 
reduced_cfg = build_reducedCFG (cfg); 
for V reducedCFG _node E reduced_ cfg 
create_ new_ minimal_ safe _partition (reducedCFG _node ); 
ReducedCFG * build _reducedCFG ( CFG* cfg) 
{ 
} 
dominance_analysis_identify_loop_body( cfg ); 
for V basic_block E cfg 
{ 
} 
II basic block has been processed? 
if( is_in_created_reducedCFG_node ( basic_block)) 
continue; 
if ( is_inside _loop_ body (basic_ block) ) 
create_ new _reducedCFG _node (get_ loop_ body (basic_ block)); 
else 
create _new _reducedCFG _node (basic_ block); 
return reduced_ cfg; 
FIG. 8 
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void non_dereferenced_data_partitioning ( SafePartition * safe_partition) 
{ 
for \:;/ cfg_node E safe_partition-7cfg_node_set 
{ 
} 
Instr List * instr _list= get_instr _list ( cfg_ node); 
for \:;/ instr E instr list 
{ 
for (index= O; index< src_opnds_size(instr); index++) 
{ 
} 
Opnd opnd = get_src (instr, index); 
VariableSymbol* var= NULL; 
if (is_ variable ( opnd)) 
{ 
var= get_ variable ( opnd); 
} 
if(var) 
safe_partition-7add _to_ non _dereferenced_ data _set( var); 
for (index= 0; index< dst_ opnds_size(instr); index++) 
{ 
Opnd opnd =get_ dst (instr, index); 
VariableSymbol* var= NULL; 
if (is_ variable ( opnd)) 
{ 
var= get_ variable (opnd); 
} 
if(var) 
safe_partition-7 add _to_ non_ dereferenced_ data_ set( var); 
FIG. 9 
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void dereferenced_data_partitioning ( SafePartition * safe_partition) 
{ 
for \:/ cfg_node E safe_partition-7cfg_node_set 
{ 
InstrList * instr_list = get_instr_list (cfg_node); 
for \f instr E instr list 
{ 
op_code =get_ opcode (instr); 
if((op_code=LOD)ll (opcode=STR)ll(opcode==MEMCPY)) 
{ 
LocationSet ** location_sets = get_location_sets (instr); 
for \f location set E location sets 
{ - -
int opnd_index = location_set-7get_ value(O); 
if ( opnd _index== -2)11( opnd_index== -3 )) 
{ 
for( int index =I; index< location_set-7size(); index++) 
{ 
int location =location_ set-7 get_ value(index); 
VariableSymbol *var= location_to_ variable(location); 
if (var) 
safe _partiti on-7 add_ to_ dereferenced_ data_ set (var); 
1 
FIG. 10 110 
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MergedPartition * minimal_ safe _partitions_ merging (SafePartition *topo _ordered_ minimal_partition _Iist) 
{ 
MergedPartition *merged _partition_ list =NULL; 
MergedPartition *cur_merged_partition =NULL; 
MergedPartition *prev_merged_partition =NULL; 
for( cur _partition=topo _ordered_ minimal_partition _list; cur _partition;) 
{ 
if{!cur_merged_partition) //create a new merged partition 
{ 
} 
cur_ merged _partition = new_ merged _partition(); 
if(prev _merged _partition) 
prev_merged_partition-7next= cur_merged_partition; //chain it up 
if( !merged _partition_ list) 
merged _partition_ list = cur_ merged _partition; //merged partition list head 
II the first case, the current minimal partition can be merged into the current merged partition 
if(((cur_merged_partition-7instrs_count + cur_partition-7instrs_count) <= CODE_LIMIT) && 
} 
data_size(cur_merged_partition-7data_set U cur_partition-7data_set) <= DATA_LIMIT) 
cur_ merged _partition-7insert( cur _partition); 
cur_partition = cur_partition-7next; 
continue; 
11 the second case, the minimal partition itself is too big, it will be a merged partition itself 
else if(cur_merged_partition-7is_empty() && 
(cur_partition-7instrs_count > CODE_LIMIT II 
cur_partition-7data_set > DATA_LIMIT)) 
cur_ merged _partition-7insert(cur _partition); 
cur_yartition = cur_partition-7next; 
II end of the current merged_yartition 
prev _ merged_partition = cur_merged_partition; 
cur_ merged _yartition = cur_ merged _yartition-7next; 
return merged _partition_list; 
~ 
FIG. 11 111 
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void identify_hotJunction_set (struct CallTraceElm ** call_trace) 
{ 
int total_misses = O; 
for (int index= O; index< length(call_trace); index++) 
{ 
struct CallTraceElm* call_trace_elm = call_trace[index]; 
struct HotSetElm* hotset_elm = search_in_current_hotset ( call_trace_elm7called_func_id); 
if(hotset_elm) II hot set hit 
{ 
hotset _elm 7freq++; 
hotset_ elm 7 last_ occurrence = index; 
} 
else II hot set miss 
{ 
if( number of call trace elements scanned since last hot set eviction> MAX_ HOTSET _SIZE) 
} 
{ 
total_ misses++; 
if( total_misses > MAX_MISSES_ALLOWED) 
{ 
total_misses = O; 
evict_ current_ hotset(); 
struct HotSetElm* new_ hotset_ elm = new_ hotset_ elm(); 
new_hotset_elm7freq =I; 
new_hotset_elm7func_id = call_trace_elm7called_func_id; 
new_ hotset_ elm7first_ occurence = new_ hotset_ elm7 last_ occurrence = index; 
add _to_ current_ hotset(new _ hotset_ elm); 
void evict_current_hotset(struct CallTraceElm **call_ trace) 
{ 
for V' hotset_elm E current_hotset 
{ 
if(hotset_elm7freq >= MIN_HIT_FREQENCY) 
{ 
for(int index= hotset_elm7first_occurrence; index<=hotset_elm7last_occurrence; index++) 
{ 
} 
struct CallTraceElm * call_ trace_ elm= call_trace[index ]; 
struct FunctionSet * to_ be_ cached_ function_ set = get_ to_ be_ cached 
(call_ trace_ elm7calling_ func _id, call_trace _ elm7calling_ BB _id); 
to_ be_ cached_ function_ set7add _function(hotset_ elm7called _ func _id); 
FIG. 12 
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void determine_ additional_ call_ neededO 
{ 
Iteratively do the following until the state is stable: 
for 'If basic_ block E program control flow graph 
{ 
CallSite* p = basic_block~get_call_siteO; 
//normal case, we have to ask the runtime environment to find out the difference 
if(p) p-7need_update_call =TRUE; 
II the exit_ cached _in_ runtime function set of all the predecessors during runtime can be determined 
II statically and they all have the same function set 
if (for any predecessor pred ofbasic_block, pred-7exit_determinable ==TRUE && 
pred-7exit_cached_in_runtime is same as that of other predecessors) 
//we know at the entry of the basic block, the cached set in runtime is guaranteed to be 
II basic_ block-7entry_ cached _in_runtime 
basic_block~entry_determinable =TRUE; 
basic_ block-7entry _cached _in_ runtime= pred-7exit_ cached _in_ runtime; 
if(p) 
{ 
//if to-be-cached set at pis same as entry_cached_in_runtime, no update is needed 
if(p-7to _be_ cached== basic _block-7entry _cached _in_ runtime) 
p-7need _update_ call =FALSE; 
//otherwise, we can derive the difference in compile time and save runtime environment 
//from computing the difference 
else 
p-7only_need_simple_update_call =TRUE; 
else 
{ 
basic_ block-? entry_ determinable= FALSE; 
II if there is a call site, then we know the cached set at the exit of the basic block 
if(p) 
{ 
basic block-7exit determinable= TRUE; 
basic= block-7exi( cached_ in_ runtime = p-7to _be_ cached; 
II no call site, information passes through 
else 
{ 
basic_ block-7exit_ determinable= basic_block-7entry_ determinable; 
basic_ block-7exit_ cached _in_ runtime =basic_ block-? entry_ cached _in_ runtime; 
FIG. 14 
) 
126 
US 7,269,671 B2 
1 
SYSTEMS, METHODS AND COMPUTER 
PROGRAM PRODUCTS FOR 
LEAKAGE-PROOF PROGRAM 
PARTITIONING 
RELATED APPLICATION DATA 
2 
behavior. For example, by observing timing, one may guess 
that a loop is executing or by observing power consumption, 
or one may guess that a lot of memory operations are going 
on. This information can then be used to tamper with the 
secure system. Leakage of timing or power information is a 
somewhat indirect way to get information about the program 
properties and an attacker might have to resort to somewhat 
involved experiments to get the differential behavior. Leak-
age of control flow behavior of an application on the other 
The present invention claims the benefit of U.S. Provi-
sional Patent Application Serial No. 60/385,713, filed Jun. 4, 
2002, titled "Systems and Methods For Performing Leak-
age-Proof Program Partitioning For Embedded Devices", 
the contents of which are hereby incorporated by reference 
as if set fully herein. 
10 hand, can be very dangerous and it is much simpler for an 
attacker to find out the differential behavior. Even arbitrary 
partitioning can introduce control flow information leakage 
and present a security hazard, which is the central problem 
encountered in program partitioning for tamper-resistant 
FIELD OF THE INVENTION 15 devices. 
The present invention relates generally to systems, meth-
ods and computer program products for partitioning pro-
grams. More particularly, the invention relates to systems, 
methods and computer program products for partitioning the 20 
code and data of a program to permit program partitions to 
run on a memory constrained device and to ensure tamper 
resistance during the downloading of the program partitions 
to the device. 
The potential danger of arbitrary partitioning is illustrated 
with reference to FIGS. lA and lB. FIG. lA shows a basic 
and naive partitioning algorithm 10, which partitions the 
program into basic blocks, and FIG. lB shows a Control 
Flow Diagram (CFG) 11 corresponding to the algorithm 10. 
Briefly, this algorithm 10 allows fine control over down-
loading only those parts of the program which are needed 
during execution. 
Systems such as Die-Hellman and RSA, as are known in 
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 
One of the important embedded devices that offer a 
tamper-resistant, secure environment is a smart card. The 
typical application execution scenario in smart cards 
involves the data being downloaded on it in an encrypted 
manner and the entire application executing inside it. This 
results in an important property of tamper resistance. Since 
25 the art, may include, for example, private key operations 
consisting of computing R-y" mod n, where n is public and 
y can be found by an eavesdropper. The attacker's goal is to 
find x, the secret key. To illustrate the problem, it may be 
presumed that the implementation uses the simple modular 
30 exponentiation algorithm of FIG. lA which computes R=y" 
mod n, where x is w bits long. The corresponding CFG 11 
for this small partition of code is shown in FIG. lB. 
Assuming the algorithm is used to partition a program 
transmitted to a smart card, where the card side will ask for no part of an application resides outside, for an attacker, 
smart card is like a black box inside which nobody knows 
what is going on. In other words, one is unable to observe 
application properties from outside the card offering tamper 
resistance. 
A big concern of new generation of smart cards is memory 
resource limitation. Smart cards typically have only 8-64 
KB memory which prevents large applications from residing 
35 a program partition every time it needs it (i.e., it does not 
cache any program partitions for memory efficiency pur-
pose), it is apparent that inside the loop body if the current 
examined bit of x is 1, then the IF-part is executed (block 
16). If the current examined bit ofx is 0, then the Else-part 
40 is executed (block 18). The algorithm loop (blocks 14, 20) 
result in a sequence of IF or ELSE blocks being transmitted 
through the network. If the attacker monitors this sequence, 
from its knowledge the attacker can guess whether the 
respective bits ofx were O's or 1 'sand obtain the secret key 
on the smart card. Typically, multiple applications spread 
across multiple vendors require a high inter-operability and 
need large amount of resources. Added to the resource 
limitation are security related overheads which make even 
lesser space available to application developers. For 
example, complex encryption/decryption schemes, 
advanced security and transaction protocols and various 
authentication applications such as biometric codes have 
large data and/or code segments and it is a major struggle to 
put these features inside smart cards. This has led smart card 
application domains to be very limited and customized. In 
order to facilitate multi-applications and/or to fit large appli-
cations in the card, they must be broken into pieces. In other 
words, the smart card memory would hold only those parts 55 
of applications currently active or ready-to-execute. How-
ever, partitioning an application means that part of it will 
reside outside of the card. Furthermore, application parti-
tions transmitted to the smart card could reveal the appli-
cation behavior which in tum could be used by an attacker 60 
to launch a malicious attack. Thus, one must ensure that the 
partitions that are downloaded to the card do not reveal 
information. 
45 x. The attacker need not know whether it is a IF part or ELSE 
part; mere ability to differentiate IF part and ELSE part 
enables the guess of key x, due to the fact that the key, or its 
complement, was guessed. The attack thus utilizes the 
different program partition sequences to infer the program 
50 behavior. 
There are many different means by which information 
leakage occurs as a result of program behavior. They are 65 
based on observable program properties by the attacker and 
include timing behavior, power behavior and control flow 
The concept behind the type of attack illustrated in FIGS. 
lA and lB is similar to timing and power differential attacks. 
Each method seeks to exploit information from the differ-
ences that are available to the attacker. All an attacker needs 
to do is to sniff mo bile code packets from the network during 
transmission, match them to the ones previously transmitted 
and then try to guess the behavior from the sequence 
constructed. Armed with a reasonable computing power and 
a network tap, an attacker can exploit the security deficien-
cies of a system. It will also be appreciated that even if the 
downloaded partitions are encrypted it such an attack is not 
prevented. Typically, because a given partition and its 
encrypted version will have one to one relationship, an 
attacker can match encrypted versions of multiply transmit-
ted partitions, sequence them and then exploit the same 
information from the encrypted sequence as she would from 
the unencrypted one. 
US 7,269,671 B2 
3 
In the illustrate example described above, it is clear that 
the major problem of partitioning by basic blocks is that the 
resulting partition exposes all the control flow information. 
After multiple iterations of a loop, by watching the sequence 
of program partitions transmitted, the attacker can know 
there is a loop and which partition is loop entry, which is 
loop end. The attacker can also know inside the loop body 
there is an IF-ELSE structure and which is the program 
partition controlling the branch. The attacker can virtually 
deduce all control information of the source program, which 10 
will lead to great potential security hole. 
4 
computers, and the like, which may benefit from increased 
security and/or a decrease in the required application and 
data memory. 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS 
Having thus described the invention in general terms, 
reference will now be made to the accompanying drawings, 
which are not necessarily drawn to scale, and wherein: 
FIG. lA shows an illustrative basic partitioning algorithm 
that reveals program control flow information. 
FIG. lB shows a block diagram control flow diagram of 
the basic partitioning algorithm of FIG. lA. 
As is apparent from the above discussion and illustrative 
example, what is therefore needed are systems, methods and 
computer program products for partitioning a program while 
concealing control flow information such that an attacker 
can not guess a program's behavior by observing the pro-
gram partitions transmitted through the network that are 
downloaded to a device. What is also needed is a method and 
FIG. 2 shows a block diagram illustrating a program 
15 partitioning system, according to one embodiment of the 
present invention. 
FIG. 3 shows a C language algorithm for finding recurring 
and nonrecurring functions within a mobile program, 
according to one aspect of the present invention. 
FIG. 4 shows a block diagram flow chart illustrating the 
steps implemented by the algorithm of FIG. 3 for identifying 
recurring and non-recurring functions, according to one 
embodiment of the present invention. 
computer program products for partitioning the code and 
data of a program to permit program partitions to run on a 20 
memory constrained device while ensuring tamper resis-
tance during the downloading of the program partitions to 
the device. 
FIG. 5 shows an illustrative safe partition comprising a 
25 function call, according to an illustrative example of the SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION present invention. 
FIG. 6A shows a control flow diagram comprising a loop, 
according to an illustrative example of the present invention. 
FIG. 6B shows another control flow diagram according to 
30 an illustrative example of the present invention. 
To facilitate the execution of sizeable programs on 
devices having limited available memory, such as smart 
cards, systems, methods and computer program products of 
the present invention partition a whole program when it does 
not fit in the devices memory. Minimal, safe program 
partitions are downloaded from the server on demand into 
the embedded device just before execution. The systems, 
methods and computer program products partition the code 
and data of the program such that no information regarding 
the control flow behavior of the program is leaked out. In 
other words, by observing the program partitions that are 
downloaded from the server, an attacker is unable to guess 
which branches are taken in the program and what is the 40 
control flow of the program. This property, referred to herein 
FIG. 7 shows a C language algorithm for partitioning 
non-recurring functions, according to one aspect of the 
present invention. 
FIG. 8 shows a C language algorithm for partitioning 
35 recurring functions, according to one aspect of the present 
invention. 
FIG. 9 shows a C language algorithm for partitioning data 
in non-dereferenced data accesses, according to one aspect 
of the present invention. 
FIG. 10 shows a C language algorithm for partitioning 
data in dereferenced data accesses to non-heap objects, 
according to one aspect of the present invention. 
FIG. 11 shows a C language algorithm for minimal safe 
partitions merging, according to one aspect of the present 
as tamper resistance, is valuable for secure embedded 
devices such as smart cards, which could hold sensitive 
information and/or carry out critical computation such as 
financial transactions. 45 invention. 
According to one aspect of the invention, systems, meth-
ods and computer program products of the present invention 
partition mobile code programs for code and data in a server 
side (in a system where programs are communicated from 
the server side to a device), resulting in independent pro- 50 
gram partitions which include both code and the data 
accessed by the code. The information included in each 
program partition is adequate for its execution. Mobile code 
partitions are downloaded into a device, such as an embed-
ded device, one-by-one on demand. After the execution of 55 
one partition completes, the next partition is requested from 
the server; at the same time the updated data value may be 
sent back to the server to achieve data consistency on the 
server side. Furthermore, at the server side, each requested 
partition may be dynamically optimized at an intermediate 60 
form (IF) level before being sent to the embedded device. 
FIG. 12 shows trace analysis C language algorithm for use 
in function caching, according to one aspect of the present 
invention. 
FIG. 13A shows an illustrative example of a function call 
where an updated cache function call is not required, accord-
ing to one aspect of the present invention. 
FIG. 13B shows an illustrative example of a function call 
where an updated cache function call is not required, accord-
ing to one aspect of the present invention. 
FIG. 14 shows a C language algorithm to determine if an 
updated cache function call is needed, according to one 
aspect of the present invention. 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE 
INVENTION 
It should be appreciated that although the present inven-
tion is described with respect to smart cards, it will also be 
appreciated that the methods and computer program prod-
ucts of the present invention are useful for any security 
and/or memory constrained devices, such as mobile or 
cellular phones, personal data assistants (PDAs), handheld 
The present invention now will be described more fully 
hereinafter with reference to the accompanying drawings, in 
which preferred embodiments of the invention are shown. 
65 This invention may, however, be embodied in many different 
forms and should not be construed as limited to the embodi-
ments set forth herein; rather, these embodiments are pro-
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vided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete, 
and will fully convey the scope of the invention to those 
skilled in the art. Like numbers refer to like elements 
throughout. 
6 
be presented with reference to a smart card as the device 42, 
it will be appreciated that the device 42 may represent any 
security device or memory-limited device which receives 
programs from a server 33, such as a PDA, mobile phone, 
handheld computer, or the like. 
According to the present invention, the mobile code 
program 32 first undergoes a program code and data analysis 
34. As will be described in further detail below, the program 
code and analysis 34 identifies the safe program partitions 
that can be downloaded from the server 33 on demand into 
the device 42 just before execution of the program partitions 
in the device 42. A safe program partition ensures tamper 
resistance because a sequence of such partitions does not 
reveal control flow information. According to an illustrative 
example, if Lu L2 , ... , Ln represent a series of program 
partitions transmitted from the server 33 to the device 42 
using a particular program partitioning scheme and a device 
cache policy (also referred to herein as a client policy), the 
following sequence of program partitions as the one which 
FIG. 2 shows a block diagram illustrating a program 
partitioning system 30 according to one embodiment of the 
present invention. It will be appreciated that the systems and 
methods of the present invention are described below with 
reference to block diagrams and flowchart illustrations. It 
should be understood that blocks of the block diagrams and 10 
flowchart illustrations, and combinations of blocks in the 
block diagrams and flowchart illustrations, respectively, 
may be implemented by computer program instructions. 
These computer program instructions may be loaded onto a 
general purpose computer, special purpose computer, or 15 
other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a 
mechanism, such that the instructions which execute on the 
computer or other programmable data processing apparatus 
create means for implementing the functions specified in the 
flowchart block or blocks. 20 leaks control flow information (violating tamper resistance): 
These computer program instructions may also be stored 
in a computer-readable memory that can direct a computer 
or other programmable data processing apparatus to function 
in a particular marmer, such that the instructions stored in the 
computer-readable memory produce an article of manufac- 25 
ture including instruction means that implement the function 
specified in the flowchart block or blocks. The computer 
program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or 
other progranmiable data processing apparatus to cause a 
series of operational steps to be performed on the computer 30 
or other progranmiable apparatus to produce a computer 
implemented process such that the instructions that execute 
In this sequence program partition L, appears in the 
sequence followed by program partition Lk at some time, but 
later, L, appears again followed by program partition Lm 
which is different than Lk. If such a sequence appears, then 
the attacker can guess that program partition L, might be a 
control block which controls the execution path to Lk or Lm. 
Therefore, it should be appreciated that a safe partition of a 
program is a partition of a program which can never appear 
twice in a sequence such as shown by the sequence of 
partitions above. The concept of the safe partition is used by 
the systems, methods and computer program products of the 
on the computer or other programmable apparatus provide 
steps for implementing the functions specified in the flow-
chart block or blocks. 35 present invention to partition programs transmitted to a 
device 42. Furthermore, a minimal safe partition is the 
smallest safe partition such that any sub partition of the 
minimal safe partition will reveal sequence and thus, control 
information. 
Accordingly, blocks of the block diagrams and flowchart 
illustrations support combinations of means for performing 
the specified functions, combinations of steps for perform-
ing the specified functions and program instruction means 
for performing the specified functions. It will also be under- 40 
stood that each block of the block diagrams and flowchart 
illustrations, and combinations of blocks in the block dia-
grams and flowchart illustrations, can be implemented by 
special purpose hardware-based computer systems that per-
form the specified functions or steps, or combinations of 
special purpose hardware and computer instructions. 
Referring again to FIG. 2, according to the present 
invention the mobile program 32 is partitioned in the server 
33 for its code and data, resulting in independent program 
partitions which include both code and the data accessed by 
the code. Despite the partitioning, the information included 
Referring again to FIG. 2, the program partitioning sys-
tem 30 includes a mobile code server 33 and a device 42. 
The server 33 and device 42 communicate with each other 
via the network 39. The network 39 may comprise, e.g., a 
wired electrical connection, and infrared communication 
path, a cellular connection, a Bluetooth wireless connection, 
45 in each program partition is adequate for its execution. By 
observing these program partitions downloaded to the 
device 42 from the server 33, an attacker is unable to guess 
which branches are taken in the program and what is the 
control flow of the program. This tamper resistance property 
50 is valuable for secure embedded devices, such as smart 
cards, which may hold sensitive information and/or carry 
out critical computation such as financial transactions. 
According to one aspect of the invention, the program code 
and data analysis 34 is implemented by a program partition-
or any like communication medium known to those of 
ordinary skill in the art. The methods and computer program 
products of the present invention operate on the mobile code 
server 33 to partition mobile programs 32 such that only 
partitions of the mobile program 32 are transmitted to the 
memory-limited device 42. The information included in 
each program partition is adequate for its execution and the 
mobile code partitions are downloaded into the 42 one-by- 60 
one on demand. Because the device only receives execut-
able, partitioned portions of the mobile program 32, the 
device 42 can execute programs the device cannot otherwise 
execute due to the limited memory of the device 42. Accord-
ing to one illustrative embodiment of the present invention, 65 
the device 42 is a memory-limited tamper resistant device, 
such as a smart card. Though the remaining disclosure will 
55 ing algorithm (not illustrated) operable to compile C and 
C++ mobile programs. 
After the program partitions are identified, the server 33 
partitions the program into multiple program partitions 36. 
The partitioning may also be implemented by the program 
partitioning program. After the partitions are generated, the 
partitions are dynamically optimized 38 such that a minimal 
number of safe program partitions are combined while still 
ensuring that the combined partitions do not reveal infor-
mation regarding the control flow behavior of the program 
when they are transmitted to the device 42. The merging of 
partitions is discussed in detail with reference to a merging 
algorithm, below. It should be appreciated that combining 
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partitions minimizes the number of transmissions from the 
server 33 to the device 42. From the memory utilization 
point of view, it is preferred that the safe partition be as small 
as possible, or a minimal safe partition. However, because 
transmitting a number of small code snippets through a 
network at runtime may lead to very low efficiency, adjacent 
minimal safe partitions may be combined into a larger one 
and the result will still be safe in that the transmission of the 
partitions to the device 42 will not result in control flow 
information leakage. 
Dynamic optimization, which may also be performed by 
the program partitioning program, can also query the device 
10 
42 to determine its memory requirements or cache policies 
such that the appropriate number and size of partitions are 
transmitted to the device 42. It will be appreciated that in 15 
partitioning a program to prevent control flow information 
from being discoverable as program partitions are transmit-
ted from the server 33 to the device 42, it is important that 
the systems, methods and computer program products of the 
present invention select only those safe partitions that will 20 
not leak program control flow information by observation of 
their sequence when transmitted at a client's request. Safe 
partitioning according to the present invention is based not 
only on how a program is divided and transmitted, but also 
on how and when those partitions are sent via the network 25 
39 to the device 42. Because what is transmitted to the 
device 42 depends on the cache policy of device 42 (e.g., 
whether to cache whole or part of incoming program parti-
tions or not), it will be appreciated to those of skill in the art 
that safe program partitioning depends both on how to 30 
divide the program and on client policy of managing parti-
tions. 
8 
embedded program finishes execution. This policy is the 
least memory efficient one and puts highest memory burden 
on the client device. Even if a program partition will never 
be accessed again in the future, the device has to keep it in 
its local memory, wasting precious memory resource in 
embedded devices. However, because the device perma-
nently stores program partition, this policy does not raise 
significant security concerns because program partitions 
need not be transmitted to the device more than once. 
Under 'Keep Nothing Received', a device will discard the 
program partition immediately after its execution. This 
policy puts least memory burden on client device because 
the device only needs to keep a single program partition 
currently executing. This policy may be applied in the 
situations where client's memory is very limited. Because 
client will keep nothing, every program partition must be 
retransmitted when it is needed. 
Under the third policy, 'Keep Partitions To Which Control 
Is Guaranteed To Return', a device will keep the safe 
partitions which control is guaranteed to return back. For 
examples of such partitions, consider a basic block contain-
ing a function call. Under this policy, after the function call, 
the control is guaranteed to return back to the calling basic 
block which is kept in memory under this policy. This policy 
places much less memory burden on client device than keep 
everything received policy because it only keeps partitions 
which will be definitely accessed again in the future. 
Next, program partitioning algorithms according to the 
present invention will be considered. These partitioning 
algorithms partition the code and data of the program such 
that no information regarding the control flow behavior of 
the program is leaked out. 
According to one aspect of the present invention, systems, 
methods and computer program products of the present 
According to one aspect of the invention, the requested 
mobile code partitions 40, 44 are downloaded into the device 
42 one-by-one on demand. According to one aspect of the 
present invention, at the server side, each requested partition 
might be dynamically optimized at an intermediate form (IF) 
level before being sent to the embedded device. Because the 
program partitions are not transmitted in assembly code, the 
communication between the server 33 and device 42 can 
occur faster than otherwise possible if the partitions are 
transmitted in native code, such as binary form, which may 
35 invention implement a program partitioning algorithm 
applied to each function of a mobile program. Thus, accord-
ing to one embodiment of the invention, the program par-
titioning is applied on a function by function basis. Con-
tinuing with the illustrative embodiment in which the device 
be several times larger than the intermediate form. 
40 is a smart card, functions, which are well known in the art, 
may be transmitted to the smart card with data suitable for 
the smart card to execute the function. The smart card will 
then execute the function, returning a response to the server 
Upon receiving a partition, the device 42 executes its 
partition manager and loader/linker 46, which determines 45 
the correct destination for the partition. The partition man-
ager 46 therefore resolves the partitions and registers their 
locations in memory. After executing a program 48, the 
device 42 communicates any required results, or updated 
data values 50, back to the server 33. Because the device 42 50 
may not update data values each time a partition is executed, 
the updating of data values is optional. After execution 48 
the device 42 may transmit a next transmission request 52 to 
the server to request the next partition required to execute a 
function. 55 
which provided the function. As described above, control 
information leakage comes from repeatedly sent partitions 
from server. Therefore, whether a function is capable of 
being invoked multiple times during a program run is critical 
to tamper-resistant partitioning algorithm. 
Because retransmission of a program partition (or a 
function) will result in the possibility of control flow infor-
mation leakage, methods and computer program products of 
the present invention classify functions as non-recurring and 
recurring functions. Only after this classification occurs can 
the partitioning of a program occur. 
Non-recurring functions are those functions that will be 
called at most once during the program execution. As such, 
the functions need not be transmitted to the device multiple 
times for a program to execute. An illustrative example of a 
non-recurring function is the main function in C language 
As noted above, tamper resistance is affected both by 
program partitioning methods or techniques and a client's 
caching policies because together these determine the par-
titions that are transmitted through the network. Systems, 
methods and computer program products of the present 
invention may function to download partitions to a device 
operating under any of three separate device cache policies: 
(1) 'Keep Everything Received'; (2) 'Keep Nothing 
Received'; and (3) 'Keep Partitions To Which Control Is 
Guaranteed To Return'. 
60 because it occurs only once in a C program. Other examples 
of non-recurring functions include program initialization 
functions and finalization functions. On the other hand, 
recurring functions are those functions which may be called 
multiple times. These raise a clear and significant concern of 
Under 'Keep Everything Received', a device will keep 
every program partition the server sends to it until the 
65 control flow information leakage which the systems, meth-
ods and computer program products of the present invention 
seek to eliminate. 
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According to the present invention, a simple static pro-
gram analysis reveals whether a function is recurring or 
non-recurring. An algorithm 60 implementing such an 
analysis, in C language, is illustrated in FIG. 3. According to 
one aspect of the invention, the algorithm 60 comprises at 
least a portion of the program partitioning algorithm 
executed by the server 33. As shown in the algorithm 60, an 
augmented program call graph, as is well known in the art, 
is first built. Each node in the call graph is augmented by 
three pieces of information: (1) whether the function has 10 
only one static occurrence; (2) whether the function is ever 
called in a loop body; and (3) whether the address of the 
function is ever assigned to a function pointer. A breath first 
traversal of the augmented call graph then occurs. 
The function of the algorithm 60 is illustrated in block 15 
diagram form in the flow chart of FIG. 4. The flow chart 
illustrates that after an augmented call graph is constructed, 
a non-root node in the augmented call graph is identified 
(block 64). As shown in FIG. 4, each non-root node is then 
subjected to a series of queries to determine if the non-root 20 
node is non-recurring. First, the algorithm determines ifthe 
non-root node has only one static occurrence (block 66). If 
not, the non-root node is marked as recurring (block 72). 
Otherwise, the algorithm determines ifthe non-root node is 
within a loop body (block 68). If so, the non-root node is 25 
marked as recurring (block 72). If not, the algorithm next 
determines ifthe non-root node's unique calling function is 
a non-recurring one (block 70). If not, the non-root node is 
marked as recurring (block 72). Otherwise, the algorithm 
determines whether the non-root node's function is assigned 30 
to a function pointer (block 74). If so, the non-root node is 
marked as recurring (block 72). Otherwise, the non-root 
node is marked as non-recurring (block 76). Finally, 
although not illustrated, each non-root node follows this 
series of inquiries, and each is marked as either recurring or 35 
non-recurring using this process. 
10 
The minimal safe partitions are each basic program block, 
and the server can simply send out, using the program 
partition algorithm, each program partition the client 
requests. 
On the other hand, the program partitioning algorithm 
must prevent partitions from being retransmitted under both 
the 'Keep Nothing Received' and 'Keep Partitions To Which 
Control Is Guaranteed To Return' policies. The reason for 
this is that partitions may be transmitted regularly and 
multiple times under each of these policies due to the fact 
that the device memory does not retain a permanent copy of 
all program information it needs to execute under all con-
ditions. Before the partitioning algorithms implemented by 
the present invention for each of these policies are discussed, 
the effect of function calls to tamper-resistant program 
partitioning should be briefly addressed so as to make clear 
the purpose and function of the partitioning algorithms of 
the present invention. 
A sample function call within a safe partition is illustrated 
with respect to FIG. 5. As shown in FIG. 5, in safe partition 
Lu 80, there is a function call F 1 82. The function body 92 
of F 1 82 is shown on the right hand side of FIG. 5. When a 
client device encounters the function call, it will ask for the 
safe partitions of function F 1 82 and it will discard safe 
partition Lu 80 to maximize the available memory for the 
incoming program partitions under the 'Keep Nothing 
Received' policy. When the execution of function F 1 82 is 
complete, the control will return to Lu 80. The client then 
has to request the retransmission of Lu 80. Therefore, the 
resulting partition sequence sent through network is: 
... , Lu 80, L21 86, L22 88, L23 90, Lu 80, L12 84. 
Lu 80 is followed by L 21 86 and L 12 84 respectively. This 
violates the strict tamper resistance definition due to the fact 
that Lu can be noted as a possible control partition. Thus, it 
will be appreciated that a function with a function call 
cannot be partitioned under the 'Keep Nothing Received' 
policy. A similar result occurs under the 'Keep Partitions To 
Which Control Is Guaranteed To Return' policy. Neverthe-
less, Lu 80 is not a control block which controls the branch 
to L21 86 or L12 84 and from the above sequence, an attacker 
can not get any correct control flow information inside a 
function. In a worst case scenario, an attacker may know 
there is a function call in Lu and L 21 , L 22 , L 23 consist of the 
function body. However, under both the 'Keep Nothing 
Received' and 'Keep Partitions To Which Control Is Guar-
anteed To Return' policies function calls do not reveal 
It will be appreciated that the algorithm 60 illustrated in 
FIG. 3 and represented by the block diagram flow chart of 
FIG. 4 does not handle functions without static occurrence 
that are not included in the augmented call graph. That is, if 40 
a function has no static occurrence, the method of the 
present invention will assume it is called through a function 
pointer, and will be categorized as a recurring function by 
default. Therefore, this algorithm 60 is a conservative one 
because it does not perform pointer analysis. Rather, when- 45 
ever the address of a function is assigned to a function 
pointer, the algorithm 60 assumes that the function is a 
recurring one. Because there are typically only a few non-
recurring functions, the conservativeness of the algorithm 60 
has little impact in practice. 50 control flow information of the program as branches do, as 
the block following function call is always executed assum-
ing normal return of the call. Rather, function calls simply 
are manifestations of modular design and might reveal 
modularity information which can not be utilized effectively 
According to one aspect of the present invention, the 
simple static program analysis revealing whether a function 
is recurring or non-recurring is implemented by the program 
partition algorithm. After dividing the partitioning problem 
into non-recurring function partitioning and recurring func- 55 
ti on partitioning, the program partitioning algorithm is ready 
to alter control flow. 
Next, methods and computer program products to parti-
tion programs under the 'Keep Nothing Received' and 
'Keep Partitions To Which Control Is Guaranteed To Return' 
policies will be described for partitioning a non-recurring 
to partition the program. The function of the program 
partitioning algorithm of the present invention will net be 
discussed with respect to the three client cache policies 
discussed above. 60 function and a recurring function. Because the partitioning 
algorithms for partitioning non-recurring and recurring 
functions are the same for both the 'Keep Nothing Received' 
and 'Keep Partitions To Which Control Is Guaranteed To 
First, under the 'Keep Everything Received' policy, a 
client device will keep every partition it receives. Thus, 
every partition of the program will be sent through the 
network at most once. As such, there is no potential danger 
that the control leakage will occur because it only occurs 65 
from repeatedly transmitted partitions. Therefore, arbitrary 
partitioning can occur and the transmission will remain safe. 
Return' policies, the partitioning algorithms for each policy 
will be considered simultaneously. 
Referring now to non-recurring functioning partitioning, 
the present invention will not partition a loop body, where a 
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loop occurs when two or more separate part1t10ns may 
follow a particular partition. FIG. 6A shows a CFG 94 
including a loop, according to an illustrative example of the 
present invention. The loop comprises partitions Bu B2 , B3 
and B4 . Because B1 can be followed by either B2 , B4 or by 
B3 , B4 , it will be appreciated that the partitions which 
comprise the loop must remain together, or control flow 
information may be accessible. As a result, methods and 
computer program products of the present invention, and in 
particular, the program partition algorithm, maintain loop 
bodies together (i.e., the partitions comprising the loops) for 
transmission to a device. 
AC language algorithm 100 for partitioning non-recur-
ring functions is illustrated in FIG. 7, according to one 
embodiment of the present invention. Although the algo-
rithm 100 is directed to devices operating under a 'Keep 
Nothing Received' policy, the same algorithm 100 is appli-
cable to devices operating under the 'Keep Partitions To 
Which Control Is Guaranteed To Return' policy. The algo-
rithm 100 creates minimal safe partitions using the rules set 
forth above. According to one aspect of the present inven-
tion, the algorithm 100 may be implemented by the program 
partitioning algorithm. Applying the algorithm 100 to the 
illustrative example of FIG. 6A, the minimal safe partitions 
should be Ll={B 1 , B2 , B3 , B4 } and L2={B5 }. The program 
partition execution sequence is given by L1 , L2 but the 
sequence sent through the network is Lu L2 , which is 
tamper-resistant. It will be appreciated by those of skill in 
the art that the device may not require all of the partitions in 
12 
For the CFG 96 of FIG. 6B, the server will predetermine a 
topological sequence for example R1 , R2 , R3 , R4 , Rs- In 
runtime, the server always sends out this sequence to the 
client regardless of control flow. Among the program parti-
tions sent, there are d=y safe partitions. For example, if 
the real execution path is R1 , R2 , R5 , then R3 , R4 are dummy 
partitions. 
It will be appreciated that the partitioning algorithms 
described above with respect to FIGS. 7 and 8 provide the 
10 safest minimal partitions. According to a less preferred 
embodiment of the present invention, safe, but not neces-
sarily minimal, partitions may also be identified. To execute 
such a partition, the following steps may be taken to 
partition a main program into safe regions: (1) locate each 
15 loop entry and loop exit, and take the union of the nodes as 
a safe region; and (2) make the other basic blocks in the loop 
body, but not in the first safe region, the second safe region. 
These steps are similar to the partitioning of non-recurring 
functions described above, but do not ensure minimal par-
20 titians. Additionally, the following steps may be imple-
mented to partition a procedure body: (1) create reduced 
CFG for the procedure body; (2) because the entry node of 
the reduced CFG for that procedure is a minimal safe region 
itself, set last minimal safe region to this safe region; (3) for 
25 all the successors of the reduced nodes in the last minimal 
safe region: if all the predecessor nodes of a particular 
successor node have been processed, add this successor 
node to the current minimal safe region, else do nothing. ( 4) 
L1 to execute a desired function. For instance, the device 30 
may follow the flow of sub-partitions B1 , B2 and B4 , in 
which case partition B3 is not needed for execution. How-
ever, this partition is transmitted to the device to maintain 
tamper resistance, as not including it may require its retrans-
mission to the device violating tamper resistance. 35 
after all the successor nodes have been processed, set last 
minimal safe region to current minimal safe region; and (5) 
repeat steps 3 and 4 until the exit node of the reduced CFG 
has been processed. These steps are an alternative to, but 
similar to the partitioning of recurring functions described 
above, but do not ensure minimal partitions. 
As noted above, each of the algorithms discussed herein 
may be implemented by the program partitioning algorithm 
within the server 33. Therefore, the program partitioning 
algorithm can effectively identify recurring and nonrecur-
ring functions within a mobile program, and can partition the 
mobile program according to the methods set forth above. 
Given the cache policy of a device, the program partitioning 
algorithm can also transmit the appropriate partitions to a 
client device. 
Although the partitioning of programs has been described 
in detail, it will be appreciated that another aspect of the 
present invention is in the partitioning of data. It will be 
appreciated that memory-limited devices such as smart cards 
contain not only limited memory available for executing 
programs, but also limited memory for storing data. There-
Next, methods and computer program products for par-
titioning a recurring function will be discussed. Like the 
partitioning of a non-recurring function, a recurring function 
having a loop therein ay result in control flow information 
leakage during transmission of the partitions from a server 40 
to a device. Therefore, the same rule applies that a loop-body 
camiot be partitioned. A C language algorithm 104 for 
partitioning recurring functions is illustrated in FIG. 8, 
according to one embodiment of the present invention. 
Although the algorithm 104 is directed to devices operating 45 
under a 'Keep Nothing Received' policy, the same algorithm 
104 is applicable to devices operating under the 'Keep 
Partitions To Which Control Is Guaranteed To Return' 
policy. The algorithm 104 creates minimal safe partitions 
using the rules set forth above and can be implemented by 
the program partitioning algorithm executing in the server. 
50 fore, the systems, methods and computer program products 
of the present invention and described above with respect to 
program partitioning may also be used to effect data parti-
tioning. In particular, using the present invention the server 
33 may transmit only the data required for use by the device 
It will be appreciated that the partitioning algorithm 104 
for recurring functions is virtually same as the algorithm 100 
for non-recurring functions, but the runtime behavior of the 
server side is different. For non-recurring functions, a server 
according to the present invention simply sends the safe 
partitions as requested by the client. But for recurring 
functions, the server will send a predetermined safe partition 
sequence which includes all the reduced nodes in the recur-
ring function. However, this sequence cannot be an arbitrary 
sequence. FIG. 6B shows CFG partition sequence 96 
according to another illustrative example of the present 
invention. For example, in FIG. 6B, R2 should not be 
transmitted before R1 . Rather, the sequence corresponds to 
one of the topological order of the reduced graph nodes. Due 
to acyclic nature of the reduced graph and topological order 
imposed on the sequence, the sequence is tamper-resistant. 
55 42 to execute a current algorithm. To run program partitions 
on the client side, the data needed by the code partitions is 
required. Rather than transmitting the sending the whole 
data segment plus stack and heap of the program, which is 
very inefficient, methods and computer program products of 
60 the present invention only send the data accessed by the 
particular code partitions. 
The data accesses of a partition of code can be divided 
into three categories: (1) non-dereferenced data accesses, 
which corresponds to direct accesses to locally defined 
65 variables in stack and globally defined variables in data 
segment (no pointer dereference is involved); (2) derefer-
enced data accesses to non-heap objects, in which a pointer 
US 7,269,671 B2 
13 
can point to an object residing in stack or program data 
segment. Those objects are statically defined and allocated 
in the program so accurate points-to information statically 
for such objects are identifiable; and (3) dereferenced data 
accesses to heap objects: a pointer pointing to a heap object. 
Heap objects are allocated and freed dynamically. Algo-
rithms 108, 110 for partitioning data in the first two catego-
ries above are illustrated, respectively, in FIGS. 9 and 10. 
Like the algorithms considered above, these algorithms may 
be implemented by the program partitioning algorithm such 10 
that the program partitioning algorithm can effectively par-
tition both a program and the data necessary to operate a 
partitioned program. It should be appreciated that the third 
category, dereferenced heap accesses, is preferably managed 
independently by the client device because of the complexi- 15 
ties associated with extracting accessed heap objects. 
Next, an additional method of the present invention, the 
merging of safe partitions, will be explained in detail. Like 
the above methods, which may be implemented by computer 
program products, and more specifically, the program par- 20 
titioning algorithm, the methods of merging safe partitions 
also occurs within the server 33. The merging of safe 
partitions may also be implemented by the program parti-
tioning algorithm. 
The algorithms disclosed above illustrated how the 25 
present invention is operable to identify minimal safe par-
titions under different device cache policies. According to 
the tamper-resistant partitioning algorithms described 
herein, a function body is partitioned into multiple safe 
partitions in such a way as to guarantee that during every 30 
invocation of the function, the sequence of safe partitions 
sent is identical, so as to eliminate the leakage of program 
control information from the differential of sequences of 
program partitions. Thus, the sending sequence of the safe 
partitions during a program execution is actually predeter- 35 
mined and fixed, and every time the same sequence will be 
transmitted. Because of this important property, adjacent 
safe partitions may be merged into a larger one while not 
compromising tamper resistance. 
14 
Finally according to yet another aspect of the present 
invention, systems, methods and computer program prod-
ucts of the present invention can further optimize the ability 
of a device having inadequate memory to store program 
functions. In particular, in the absence of any mandatory 
requirement to keep partitions in memory, a rather large 
overhead may be incurred to fetch the needed partitions 
from the server every time they are needed. For instance, 
where the device and server communicate via a cellular 
network, these communications may become expensive. 
Even with safe partitions merging, a huge communication 
and downloading overhead can result. To reduce runtime 
overheads, the present invention can implement function 
caching in the client device. Function caching will enable a 
client to leave a part of memory dedicated for caching a set 
of functions. When the cached function is called again, client 
will not request it from the server but will fetch it from local 
memory directly. Which function(s) should be kept in the 
client memory at a given program point may be determined 
statically by the program partitioning algorithm, which is 
also referred to hereinafter as the compiler. A static solution 
is preferred because a dynamic cache eviction algorithm on 
a client side device is expensive. 
The framework of the function caching mechanism of the 
present invention consists of three steps: (1) program instru-
mentation; (2) hot function set identification and optimiza-
tion; and (3) compilation/runtime environment support. In 
particular, certain sets of functions, or hot function sets, are 
regularly called by a program during a period of time. 
Function caching identifies the hot function set at each call 
site. The hot function set for each call site is decided 
statically and fixed during program run. For each user-
defined function call, instructions dump out the ID of the 
calling function, the ID of the calling basic block, the ID of 
the called function. In this way, a trace is generated with the 
information of which function is called at which program 
point. After obtaining the function call trace, methods and 
computer program products of the present invention are 
operable to capture patterns in the trace. Hot functions are 
Merging multiple partitions reduces the transmission time 
for downloading programs to the device. Minimal safe 
partitions create inefficiencies due to the fine granularity 
during execution. In order to alleviate this problem, the 
present invention provides a novel solution that is scalable 
40 those functions whose IDs are in high frequency patterns 
over a certain period. 
to the amount of available data and code memory on the 45 
device. This is achieved by merging adjacent minimal safe 
partitions under the memory capacity constraint. It is shown 
that doing so does not violate the tamper resistance property. 
The merging algorithm (e.g., implemented by the pro-
gram partitioning algorithm or a separate merging algorithm 50 
within the server) is guided by resource limitations of the 
device's code size limit and data size limit. Therefore, the 
merging algorithm takes the original minimal safe partitions 
and the device's code size limit and data size limit as an 
input. The merging of code partitions then occurs to ensure 55 
that a merged partition, which is the sum of multiple 
partitions, will not exceed the device's memory resources. 
Additionally, this merging can occur for both code and data. 
Therefore, the result of data merging is the union of refer-
enced data. To effect merging, methods of the present 60 
invention find a partition of items so that the number of 
partitions is minimum under two conditions: (1) the partition 
can not reorder the items; and (2) if a single original item has 
exceeded resource limit by itself, it is not merged with other 
items. FIG. 11 shows an algorithm 111, according to one 65 
embodiment of the present invention, for minimal safe 
partitions merging. 
The trace analysis algorithm then divides the lifetime of 
a hot function set for a trace region into three phases. For 
each phase, a different strategies may be applied as follows: 
(1) Hot set growing and stabilizing. In this phase, a new 
hot set is being built and maybe not all the hot functions 
in this region have been included in the hot set. In this 
phase, the algorithm allows the current hot set to grow 
without interference. When the length of calling trace 
scanned exceeds the predefined maximum size of a hot 
set, current hot set enters maintaining phase. 
(2) Hot set maintaining. In this phase, hot set for this 
region has been built up. The function calls that follow 
are supposed to exhibit a hit in the hot set. During this 
phase, the total hot set misses since the hot set was built 
up are counted. If the misses exceed the predefined 
maximum misses allowed, current hot set enters dis-
carding phase. 
(3) Hot set discarding. Hot set enters this phase because 
hot set misses are observed which are indications of the 
hot set transition point. Once upon a hot set enters this 
phase, the functions in the hot set are evicted and if the 
hit count of a function is greater than or equal to a 
predefined minimum hit frequency, the region currently 
examined will be guided to cache this function. A 
frequency check is executed to get rid of the noises in 
the hot set. 
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There are several control parameters in the trace analysis 
algorithm. By increasing the max hot set size longer patterns 
16 
there is no way to know which set is cached currently in 
runtime, so an updated cache function call is needed. FIG. 
14 shows a C language algorithm 126 to determine if an 
undated cache function call is needed, according to one 
aspect of the present invention. 
After identifying the compiler guided function set to be 
cached at each call site, the compiler can derive the memory 
requirement of the program. It will first guarantee the hot 
functions memory requirement at each call site to achieve 
in the trace may be discovered while at the same time taking 
risk to introduce noise and combine multiple hot sets into 
one. Max misses allowed has a similar effect to max hot set 
size. Minimum hit frequency is a guard to filter noise in the 
hot set and to ensure the hot functions found are hot enough. 
Different programs show different calling trace behavior. 
These parameters allow us to find a per application balance 
between performance and memory requirement easily. The 
C language algorithm 112 of FIG. 12 shows the trace 
analysis algorithm in a high-level view. 
The hot function set at each call site is the function set to 
10 good performance, then it will examine the maximum size 
of minimal safe partitions as seen when a specific hot set is 
active. It takes the sum of these two as compiler recom-
mended memory allocation size at a specific call site. 
As is disclosed herein, the present invention provides be cached at that point. The to-be-cached set might be 
different from one point to another. Compilation and runtime 
environment support is necessary to enable hot function set 
transition. During compilation of the mobile code program, 
our compiler inserts a function call update_cached_function 
(int current_func_id, int current_BB_id) just before a user 
defined function call when necessary. Such a function call is 
necessary unless statically compiler can establish the fact 
that in runtime, currently cached function set at the call site 
15 efficient and tamper-resistant program partitioning for 
secure embedded devices (such as smart cards). The present 
invention provides tamper resistance in the transmission of 
programs to devices because there are no observable differ-
entials in the sequences of program partitions sent through 
is equal to the function set to be cached. Whether the two 
sets are equal might be unknown at a join node due to 
different sets being in cache on different edges of the join. 
The mobile program requests the runtime environment to 
update the cached functions through the inserted function 
call. When the runtime environment loads a program, it also 
loads a map of call sites to their corresponding hot function 
sets. When it receives a request, it will compare the corre-
sponding hot function set for current call site with the 
functions currently cached, find out the functions to be 
cached but not locally available, then ask for them from 
server. 
20 the network. The different policies of caching partitions in 
the device receiving program partitions impacts tamper-
resistant program partitioning techniques and the perfor-
mance of the device in executing functions (including 
memory requirements inside the device and the speed of 
25 execution of a program application). The partitioning algo-
rithms of the present invention can partition applications 
into very fine-grained pieces. However, because runtime 
performance may be degraded if partitioning is performed 
without further optimizations, merging of safe partitions and 
30 function caching are two optimizations to reduce runtime 
overhead encountered due to program partitioning. 
Many modifications and other embodiments of the inven-
tions set forth herein will come to mind to one skilled in the 
art to which these inventions pertain having the benefit of the 
It will be appreciated that the hot function set to be cached 35 teachings presented in the foregoing descriptions and the 
associated drawings. Thus, it will be appreciated by those of 
ordinary skill in the art that the present invention may be 
embodied in many forms and should not be limited to the 
embodiments described above. Therefore, it is to be under-
at each call site is known as a result of the trace analysis 
algorithm. However, each call site potentially has different 
hot function set. To dynamically change the current cached 
function set to the function set to be cached at a particular 
call site, an updated cache function call may compute the 
change. This function may be implemented by the program 
partitioning algorithm. Preferably, the call occurs just before 
each user-defined procedure call and will introduce some 
runtime performance overhead. On the other hand, if the 
compiler can guarantee that the current cached function set 45 
is equal to the function set to be cached, the inserted updated 
cache function call is unnecessary to improve performance. 
Moreover, according to one aspect of the present invention, 
40 stood that the inventions are not to be limited to the specific 
embodiments disclosed and that modifications and other 
if two hot function sets are not equal, it is possible to utilize 
a simpler version of the call which provides the difference to 50 
runtime environment explicitly so that runtime environment 
doesn't need to compute the difference itself, resulting in 
lower cost. An illustrative example is illustrated in FIG. 
13A. 
In the example 114 of FIG. 13A, in basic block B1 115, 55 
there is a function call foo( ). To be cached set is f1 , f2 , fy 
The only predecessor of basic block B2 116 is B1 . So when 
program runs to B2 , 116, it is guaranteed that the control 
comes from B1 115. As such, it is known that the current 
cached set is { fu f2 , f3 }. It is same as the to-be-cached set 60 
at function call site foo2( ). Therefore, an updated cache 
function call to change the cached function set is not 
required. FIG. 13B shows an example where an updated 
cache function call is needed. In this example, block B3 123 
has two predecessors, block B1 121 and block B2 122. The 65 
current cached function set will be different depending on 
the control comes from which predecessor. Thus, statically 
embodiments are intended to be included within the scope of 
the appended claims. Although specific terms are employed 
herein, they are used in a generic and descriptive sense only 
and not for purposes of limitation. 
That which is claimed: 
1. A method of transmitting a program to a device, 
comprising: 
analyzing a program to identify one or more executable 
functions in said program; 
determining whether each of the one or more executable 
functions is a recurring or non-recurring function, 
wherein a non-recurring function is executed only once 
during operation of the program, and wherein a recur-
ring function is executed more than once during opera-
tion of the program; 
partitioning the program into a plurality of program 
partitions based at least in part on the determination of 
whether each of the one or more executable functions 
is a recurring or non-recurring function; and 
transmitting the plurality of program partitions to the 
device, wherein each of said plurality of program 
partitions are transmitted to the device only once to 
avoid revealing control flow information of said pro-
gram during the transmission. 
2. The method of claim 1, wherein analyzing said program 
is implemented by computer program code. 
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3. The method of claim 1, wherein partitioning the pro-
gram into the plurality of program partitions is implemented 
by computer program code. 
4. The method of claim 1, further comprising merging at 
least two of said plurality of program partitions to generate 
a merged program partition. 
5. The method of claim 4, further comprising determining 
a memory capacity of the device prior to merging at least 
two of said plurality of program partitions to generate the 
merged program partition. 
6. The method of claim 4, further comprising transmitting 
said merged program partition to the device. 
10 
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wherein each of said plurality of program partitions 
are transmitted to the device only once to avoid 
revealing control flow information of said program 
during the transmission. 
12. The computer program product of claim 11, further 
comprising computer readable program code means for 
merging at least two of said plurality of program partitions 
to generate a merged program partition. 
13. The computer program product of claim 12, further 
comprising computer readable program code means for 
identifying the memory capacity of the device prior to 
merging at least two of said plurality of program partitions. 
14. The computer program product of claim 12, further 
7. The method of claim 1, wherein partitioning the pro-
gram into a plurality of program partitions comprises par-
titioning the program into a plurality of program partitions 
based at least in part on the identification of one ore more 
minimal safe partitions, wherein at least one of the one or 
more minimal safe partitions comprises two or more execut-
able functions that form a program loop. 
15 comprising computer readable program code means for 
transmitting said merged program partition to the device. 
8. The method of claim 7, wherein each of the minimal 20 
safe partitions are transmitted in a fixed sequence to the 
device during execution of a recurring or non-recurring 
function. 
9. The method of claim 7, further comprising merging at 
least two of said minimal safe program partitions to create 25 
a safe merged program partition. 
10. The method of claim 1, further comprising reserving, 
in said device, memory allocated for caching at least one of 
said plurality of program partitions. 
11. A computer program product for partitioning a pro- 30 
gram for transmission to a device, said computer program 
product comprising: 
a computer usable medium having computer-readable 
code means embodied in said medium, said computer-
readable code means comprising: 
computer readable program code means for analyzing 
a program to identify one or more executable func-
tions in said program; 
35 
computer readable program code means for determin-
ing whether each of the one or more executable 40 
functions is a recurring and or non-recurring func-
tion, wherein a non-recurring function is executed 
only once during operation of the program, and 
wherein a recurring function is executed more than 
once during operation of the program; 45 
computer readable program code means for partition-
ing the program into a plurality of program partitions 
based at least in part on the determination of whether 
each of the one or more executable functions is a 
recurring or non-recurring function; and 
computer readable program code means for transmit-
ting the plurality of program partitions to the device, 
50 
15. The computer program product of claim 11, wherein 
the computer readable program code means for partitioning 
the program into a plurality of program partitions comprises 
computer readable program code means for partitioning the 
program into a plurality of program partitions based at least 
in part on the identification of one ore more minimal safe 
partitions, wherein at least one of the one or more minimal 
safe partitions comprises two or more executable functions 
that form a program loop. 
16. The computer program product of claim 15, wherein 
each of the safe partitions are transmitted in a fixed sequence 
to the device during execution of a recurring or non-
recurring function. 
17. The computer program product of claim 15, further 
comprising computer readable program code means for 
merging at least two of said minimal safe program partitions 
to create a safe merged program partition. 
18. The computer program product of claim 11, further 
comprising computer readable program code means for 
reserving, in said device, memory allocated for caching at 
least one of said plurality of program partitions. 
19. A method for optimizing the performance of a device, 
comprising: 
analyzing a program to identify at least one recurring and 
at least one non-recurring function in said program; and 
using the identification of said recurring and non-recur-
ring functions to partition the program into a plurality 
of program partitions; and 
transmitting to the device a request that the device 
memory be divided into ideal code and data segment 
components for receiving the plurality of program 
partitions. 
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